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We model power grids as graphs with heavy-tailed sinks, which represent demand from cities, and
study cascading failures on such graphs. Our analysis links the scale-free nature of blackout sizes to
the scale-free nature of city sizes, contrasting previous studies suggesting that this nature is governed
by self-organized criticality. Our results are based on a new mathematical framework combining the
physics of power flow with rare event analysis for heavy-tailed distributions, and are validated using
various synthetic networks and the German transmission grid.
Securing a reliable power grid is of tremendous societal
importance due to the highly disruptive repercussions of
blackouts. Yet, the study of cascading failures in power
grids is a notoriously challenging problem due to its sheer
size, combinatorial nature, mixed continuous and discrete
processes, physics and engineering specifications [1–5].
Traditional epidemics models [6–9] are unsuitable for its
study, as the physics of power flow are responsible for a
non-local propagation of failures [10]. This challenge has
created extensive interest from the engineering and physics
communities [11–17]. Analytic models determining the
blackout size ignore the microscopic dynamics of power
flow, while the analysis of more realistic networks typically
does not go beyond simulation studies. Therefore, a
fundamental understanding of blackouts is lacking.
The total blackout size, measured in terms of number
of customers affected, is known to be scale-free [18–21],
meaning there exist constants C,α > 0 such that
P (S > x) ≈ Cx−α, (1)
where ≈ means that the ratio of both quantities ap-
proaches 1 as x → ∞. This law, also known as the
Pareto law, occurs in many applications of science and
engineering [22–26]. Its significance in our context lies in
the fact that big blackouts are substantially more likely
than one would infer from more conventional statistical
laws. As a result, mitigation policies cannot write off
extremely large blackouts as virtually impossible events,
and should focus on those in equal proportion to the small,
frequent ones. Given the tremendous societal impact of
large blackouts, understanding why (1) occurs can lead
to focused prevention and/or mitigation policies and is
therefore of major significance.
Several attempts to explain (1) have appeared in the
literature. Using simulations, previous studies suggest
that (1) may occur as a consequence of self-organized
criticality [1, 18, 19, 27, 28]. Specifically, [18] compares
simulation traces of a model for blackouts with those of a
model that is known to exhibit self-organized criticality,
and shows that the autocorrelation functions are similar.
Such indirect analogies of different observables do not
provide direct explanations into the precise mechanism
behind (1).
Other strands of literature model the cascading mecha-
nism as a branching process with critical offspring distri-
bution [29], without taking physical laws of electricity into
consideration. Such models lead to blackout sizes with
infinite mean, corresponding to a value of α = 0.5. While
a naive parametric estimation procedure using all data
would lead to values of α in the range (0, 1), modern statis-
tical techniques focusing on the tail end of the distribution
clearly indicate a finite mean blackout size [20, 21].
In this Letter, we propose a radically different and much
simpler explanation than the aforementioned suggestions.
Our central hypothesis is that (1) is inherited from a
similar law for the distribution of city sizes [26, 30–32].
We support this claim with a careful analysis of actual
data, a new mathematical framework, and supporting
simulations for additional insight and validation.
To develop intuition, we view the power grid as a con-
nected graph where nodes represent cities, which are
connected by edges modeling transmission lines. Initially,
this is a single fully functioning network with balanced
supply and demand. After several line failures, the net-
work breaks into disconnected sub-networks, referred to
as islands. The balance between supply and demand is
not guaranteed to hold in each island, and at least one
island is facing a power shortage. As the sum of total
demand will be proportional to the total population in
the island, the size of the power shortage is proportional
to the total population, which is the sum of cities in that
island. We now invoke a property of sums of Pareto dis-
tributed random variables, which informally says that the
sum is dominated by the maximum. In other words, the
size of the largest city in this island drives the scale-free
nature of the blackout. In extreme value theory, this is
known as the principle of a single big jump [33, 34].
This line of reasoning implies that city sizes and black-
out sizes both have Pareto distributions with similar tail
behavior. For the case of the US blackout sizes (in terms
of the number of customers affected) and city sizes (in
terms of population), we confirm this with historical data
as summarized in Fig. 1, which shows that the parameters
α for blackout and city sizes distributions are remarkably
similar, each having a finite mean. We refer to Supple-
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2mental Material [35], section II, for details.
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Figure 1: Left: Pareto tail behavior of US city [25] and blackout
sizes [36] in the region x > xmin. Estimates are based on
PLFIT [25]. Points depict the empirical complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF); Solid line depicts the CCDF of a
Pareto distribution with parameters α, xmin. Right: Hill estimator
xmin → α(xmin), also known as the Hill plot [35]. The PLFIT
estimates for city sizes (blue dot) and blackout sizes (red dot) lie
within a relatively flat region of the graph, providing support for
the Pareto fit.
In what follows, we make our claim rigorous by intro-
ducing a new mathematical framework that captures the
salient characteristics of actual power system dynamics [1]
and sheds light on the connection between blackout and
city sizes. For a full account, see [35], section IV.
We consider a network with n nodes andm lines. Node i
represents a city with Xi inhabitants. We consider a static
setting where each inhabitant demands one unit of energy.
We assume that the Xi’s are independent and identically
distributed Pareto random variables with P (X > x) ≈
Kx−α for constants K,α > 0. For convenience, we label
the nodes such that X1 represents the largest city.
For the electricity line flows, we adopt a linear DC power
flow model. This model approximates the more involved
AC power flow equations, is widely used in high-voltage
transmission system analysis [37], and accurately de-
scribed the evolution of the 2011 San Diego blackout [38].
Specifically, if g = (g1, ..., gn) and X = (X1, . . . , Xn) rep-
resent the power generation and demand at each city, then
the line flows f = (f1, ..., fm) are given by f = V(g−X),
where the matrix V ∈ Rm×n is determined by the network
topology and the line reactances.
Our framework consists of three stages called planning,
operational and emergency. The first two stages determine
the actual line limits and line flows. We employ the widely
used Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) for-
mulation with quadratic supply cost functions [1]:
min
g
1
2
n∑
i=1
g2i
s.t.
n∑
i=1
gi =
n∑
i=1
Xi,
(2)
subject to the reliability constraint
− f¯ ≤ V(g−X) ≤ f¯ . (3)
The planning stage concerns how the operational line
limits f¯ are set. For this, we solve (2) without (3), yielding
the uniform (across cities) solution g(pl)j = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi for
all j ≥ 1, and f (pl) = −VX (see [35], section IV). Then,
the operational line limits f¯ are set as
f¯` = λ|f (pl)` | = λ|(VX)`|, ` = 1, ...,m, (4)
where λ ∈ (0, 1] is a safety tuning parameter, referred to
as loading factor. In the operational stage, we solve (2)
subject to (3), yielding a different solution g(op) which
is not uniform due to the constraint (3). Eq. (4) implies
that line flows can have a heavy tail, which is consistent
with impedance data [39]. This property is essential, as
it allows to create a subnetwork in which the mismatch
between supply and demand is heavy-tailed.
This mismatch is established in the emergency stage,
which is described next. We focus on cascades initiated by
a single line failure, sampled uniformly across all lines. A
line failure changes the topology of the grid and causes a
global redistribution of network flows according to power
flow physics. Consecutive failures occur whenever there
are one or more lines for which the redistributed power
flow exceeds its emergency line limit F` = f¯`/λ. Failures
are assumed to occur subsequently, and take place at the
line where the relative exceedance is largest. Whenever
line failures create additional islands, we proportionally
lower either generation or demand at all nodes to restore
power balance. The cascade continues within each island
until none of the remaining emergency line limits are
exceeded anymore.
Our formulation may be extended to handle multiple
initial failures, correlated city sizes, generator failures,
simultaneous failures, generation limits, other strictly
convex supply cost functions, and other load-shedding
mechanisms. Such variations would affect the value of
the pre-factor C, but not the exponent α: the tail of the
blackout distribution is dominated by the scenario where
there is a single city that has a large power demand, while
the demand of the other cities is negligible. A formal
version of this statement is that, for sufficiently small ,
P (S > x) = P (S > x;X1 > x,Xi ≤ x, i ≥ 2) + o(x−α). (5)
This is a mathematical description of the aforemen-
tioned principle of a single big jump. After a normal-
ization argument, it suffices to consider the case where
X1 = y > 0 and Xj = 0 for j ≥ 2. Then, the solution of
the operational DC-OPF can be computed in closed form:
g
(op)
1 = (1 − λ(n − 1)/n)y and g(op)j = (λ/n)y for j ≥ 2
(see [35], Lemma IV.2). Let A1 be the set of nodes that
represents the island containing the largest city, after the
cascade has stopped. The islands that do not contain the
largest city must lower their generation to zero after a dis-
connection, and hence immediately turn stable. Iterating,
the blackout size in component A1 is given by
S =
∑
i∈A1
(Xi − gi) =
∑
j 6∈A1
(gj −Xj) = λn− |A1|
n
y. (6)
3Figure 2: Cascade in a 6-node network with X1 = 1, Xj = 0 for j ≥ 2, λ > 3/4. The four lower and upper line flows are λ/24 and 5λ/24,
respectively, with corresponding emergency limits 1/24 and 5/24. The failure of an upper line causes the load on the adjacent lower line to
surge to λ/6 > 1/24, causing this line to trip (Stage 2). This cutoff leads to the load on the three remaining lower lines to surge to λ/18,
causing them to trip as well (Stage 3). After isolating node 2 and 6, the cascade ends with |A1| = 4 and a total load shed of 2λ/6 (Stage 4).
Integrating over realizations of X1 = y, y ≥ x, and using
the property of Pareto tails P( max(X1, . . . , Xn) > x) ≈
nP(X > x) ≈ nKx−α [33], we find that (1) holds with
C = nK
n−1∑
j=1
P (|A1| = j)λα(1− j/n)α ∈ [0,∞). (7)
The most delicate step, for which [35], section IV.D pro-
vides a rigorous proof, is to show that the cascade sequence
does not change when performing the normalization ar-
gument in the limit x→∞, which is non trivial due to
continuity issues.
In [35], section IV, we show that the pre-factor C in (7)
is discontinuous at a discrete set of values of λ. At such
points, the number of possible scenarios leading to a large
blackout is increasing, and/or |A1| is decreasing in λ. We
illustrate this in Fig. 2, which also shows how the principle
of a single big jump (5), which links the total blackout size
to the size of the largest city X1, is realized by means of a
few load shedding events, each of which is a fixed fraction
of X1 and corresponds to a network disconnection.
Our analysis illustrates how heavy-tailed city sizes cause
heavy-tailed blackout sizes. Our modeling choices allow
for a precise exploration of the cascade sequence, and
inherently, an explicit formula for the blackout size tail.
However, we emphasize that the essential elements that
lead to heavy-tailed blackout sizes are that both the
demands and the line limits are heavy-tailed. The small
nodes together generate a non-negligible fraction of the
demand of the large node. When the power grid satisfies
these properties, then (5) continues to hold, leading to a
heavy-tailed mismatch whenever there is a disconnection.
We illustrate this numerically by studying the effect of
relaxing several assumptions in our framework.
The choice of a quadratic cost function in the DC-OPF
ensures that it is most efficient to divide the power gen-
eration as equally as possible among the cities, causing
all cities to generate a non-negligible fraction of the total
demand. Other strictly convex increasing cost functions
would lead to a similar effect. Moreover, our result is
robust to piecewise linear cost functions (see [35], Sec-
tion VI.C), and to the inclusion of generation limits, as
long as these limits are a non-negligible fraction of the
total demand.
To illustrate the sensitivity of our result with respect
to the chosen power flow model, we partially extend our
framework to the AC power flow model. We tested its
effect on multiple network topologies, and as illustrated
in Fig. 3a, we conclude that city size tails still drive the
blackout size tail even when the DC assumption is violated.
Intuitively, the chosen power flow model determines the
redistribution of flow after failures, and thus the cascade
sequence. This effect is captured in the prefactor, but
does not destroy the Pareto-tailed consequence in the
blackout size.
An important remark is that our mathematical frame-
work relies on the city sizes to be random variables. Nat-
urally, city sizes are essentially fixed. The remaining
source of randomness in our framework, namely the lo-
cation of the first failure, can be interpreted as a mecha-
nism to bootstrap linear combinations of city sizes. It is
well-known [33] that bootstrap methods cannot recover
heavy-tailed behavior if the data set is small. In order to
recover a Pareto tail, the frozen network therefore needs
to be sufficiently large, e.g. 104 nodes. To illustrate this,
Fig. 3b shows simulation results for the SynGrid model, a
random graph model designed to generate realistic power
grid topologies [39]. Finally, Fig. 3c reveals that Pareto-
tailed city sizes is a crucial assumption in order to recover
the same scale-free behavior for blackout sizes, as light-
tailed city sizes do not lead to heavy-tailed blackout sizes.
Additional supporting experiments are reported in [35],
section VI.
We next present experimental results using the Sci-
GRID network [40, 41], a model of the German trans-
mission grid that includes generation limits and relaxes
several assumptions. We simulate blackout realizations
by considering one year’s worth of hourly snapshots. For
each snapshot, we solve the operational DC-OPF and
remove one line uniformly at random, initiating a cascade.
To assign city sizes to nodes, we have cities correspond to
German districts, and we assign a fraction of the popula-
tion of each district to specific nodes based on a Voronoi
4(a) IEEE 39-bus
network, AC power
flow model.
(b) SynGrid model,
n = 104, frozen city
sizes.
(c) SynGrid model,
n = 104, frozen city
sizes sampled from
uniform distribution.
Figure 3: Pareto tail behavior of simulated blackout sizes using
the described cascade model with relaxed assumptions, for different
topologies and loading factor λ = 0.9. City sizes are sampled from
a Pareto distribution with tail index α(city) = 1.37 in (a,b), and
from a uniform distribution with the same mean in (c). Top:
points depict the empirical CCDF, dashed line depicts the CCDF
of a Pareto distribution with parameters α, xmin, estimated via
PLFIT [25]. Bottom: Hill plots. Red line corresponds to the tail
index α(city). A good fit is achieved when the PLFIT estimate
(blue dot) lies in a flat region closely tracing the red line.
tessellation procedure. In this way, we account for the
feature that a single city can encompass multiple nodes in
a network. For more details, we refer to [35], section VII.
The German SciGRID network has a relatively small
number of nodes (less than 600), and city sizes are frozen.
Therefore, we do not recover Pareto-tailed blackout sizes.
However, uniformly across different loading factors λ, we
found that the preponderance of blackouts involves just a
single load shedding event due to a network disconnection.
For a moderate loading factor λ = 0.7, nearly 98% of
blackouts only involve a single disconnection. Even for a
high loading factor λ = 0.9, 90% of the blackouts involve
a single disconnection, and the fraction of blackouts with
four or more disconnections is below 4%. Fig. 4 depicts
the largest observed blackout, for different values of λ.
Even in this massive blackouts, the bulk of the total load
shed is the result of a few load shedding events. These
observations are typical properties that follow from our
framework (see Fig. 2), and sharply contrast the branching
process approximations where many small jumps take
place.
Using data analysis, probabilistic analysis, and sim-
ulations, we have illustrated how extreme variations in
city sizes can cause the scale-free nature of blackouts.
Our explanation and refinement (7) of the scaling law (1)
show that specific details such as network characteristics
only appear in the pre-factor (7). The main parameter α,
which determines how fast the probability of a big black-
out vanishes as its size grows, is completely determined
by the city size distribution. Decreasing the constant (7)
by performing network upgrades (which in our framework
is equivalent to decreasing λ) would only lead to a modest
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Figure 4: Dissection of a massive blackout in the SciGRID
network for loading factors λ = 0.7 (left) and λ = 0.9 (right) in
terms of the cumulative number of affected customers at each stage
of the cascade, as displayed in the top charts with the selected
stage colored red. The corresponding islanded components are
visualized with different colors in the bottom pictures.
decrease in the likelihood of big blackouts. Consequently,
it is questionable whether network upgrades, as consid-
ered in [19, 42], are the most effective way to mitigate
the consequences of big blackouts.
Instead, it may be more effective to invest in responsive
measures that enable consumers to react to big blackouts.
It is shown in [20] that durations of blackouts have a tail
which is decreasing much faster than (1). At the same
time, production facilities often lack redundancy - even
short blackouts can lead to huge costs, suggesting that
the costs associated to a blackout are concave up to a
certain duration. Therefore, if the goal is to minimize
the negative effects of a big blackout, it may be far more
effective to invest in solutions (such as local generation
and storage) that aim at surviving a blackout of a specific
duration. This is consistent with recent studies on the
importance of resilient city design [43].
Finally, our framework and insights suggest new
ways of approaching scale-free phenomena in other
transportation networks, such as highway traffic jams [44].
While transport network topologies are not scale-free,
they may still exhibit scale-free behavior, caused by the
scale-free nature of nodal sizes.
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7Supplemental Material for:
Emergence of scale-free blackout sizes in power grids
BACKGROUND ON PARETO DISTRIBUTION
AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION
A Pareto-distributed random variable X with minimum
value xmin > 0 and tail exponent α > 0 is described by its
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)
F¯ (x)
F¯ (x) = P(X > x) =
( x
xmin
)−α
, x ≥ xmin. (8)
The expected value of X is equal to (αxmin)/(α − 1) if
α > 1, and ∞ otherwise.
In order to analyze the power law behavior of city and
blackout sizes, we use the PLFIT method introduced
in [25] to fit a Pareto distribution to a given empirical
dataset {xi}Ni=1. The PLFIT method is based on a com-
bination of the Hill estimator to find the tail exponent
α, and on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to find xmin,
as outlined below. For each possible choice of xmin, the
best-fitting tail index α is found via the Hill estimator [45]
αˆ(xmin) = n
[ ∑
xi≥xmin
ln xi
xmin
]−1
.
Then, the KS goodness-of-fit statistic D(xmin) =
maxx≥xmin |S(x)− P (x)| is calculated, where S(x) is the
empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the
data and P (x) is the CDF of the Pareto distribution with
parameters xmin and αˆ(xmin). Finally, the estimated xˆmin
is the one that minimizes D over all possible choices of
xmin. Uncertainty in the estimated tail exponent αˆ(xˆmin)
and lower bound xˆmin is quantified via the nonparametric
bootstrap method described in [25]. Finally, a goodness-
of-fit test based on the KS statistic is used to generate
a p-value that quantifies the plausibility of the power
law hypothesis. The authors in [25] suggest to use the
following (conservative) choice: the power law is ruled out
if p ≤ 0.1.
We remark that any automatic procedure for the es-
timation of the parameter xmin is imperfect and should
be paired with additional, case-by-case analysis. For in-
stance, it is not known whether the PLFIT estimator is
consistent. In this paper, we always couple the PLFIT
procedure with the manual observations of the Hill plot,
i.e. the graph of the mapping xmin → αˆ(xmin), and report
whether the PLFIT results are consistent with the visual
analysis of this plot, i.e. whether xˆmin lies within a region
where the values of α are relatively stable.
HISTORICAL DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the scale-free behavior of US
city and blackouts sizes. The data for US city sizes, as
per the 2000 US census, are available in [25]. The data for
US blackouts are extracted from the Electric Disturbance
Events Annual Summaries, Form OE-417 [36] of the US
Department of Energy, which includes information on the
date, area of interest and number of customers affected
by outage events. Here, the size of a blackout is defined
as the number of customers affected by it. The dataset
covers the period 2002-2018.
Each record, or row, of the OE-417 dataset, contains
information such as the date, area of interest and the
number of customers affected in a single outage event.
The presence of missing or noisy records in the dataset
requires the following pre-processing actions: i) records
for which the “Number of customers affected” entry is un-
known are removed; ii) records for which the “Number of
customers affected” consists of two or more values, corre-
sponding to different US states, are modified by replacing
the multiple values with their sum; iii) records for which
the “Number of customers affected” entry is not purely
numeric are removed. The only two exceptions to iii)
are when both the âĂĲcumulativeâĂİ and âĂĲpeakâĂİ
number of customers affected are reported (in which case
only the âĂĲcumulativeâĂİ values is retained), and when
the number of customers affected is described by a range
of values (in which case the midpoint value is retained).
Table I reports the PLFIT estimated parameters, the
corresponding standard deviations (calculated using the
nonparametric bootstrap method in [25]), as well as the
KS p-values, which indicate a good fit. The results for
the α-estimates (city sizes: 1.37 ± 0.06; blackout sizes:
1.31 ± 0.08 ) corroborate the claim that the scale-free
behavior of blackout sizes is inherited from the power law
distribution for city sizes.
Fig. 5a reports the CCDF and the PLFIT results, and
Fig. 5b the corresponding Hill plots. We observe that the
estimated parameters lie in the flat portion of the Hill
plots.
POWER FLOW
We model the power grid as a connected graph G =
G(N ,L), where the set of nodes N represents the n buses
in the system, and the set of edges L corresponds to the
m transmission lines. Let g,d ∈ Rn represent the nodal
generation and load vectors, respectively, and p = g − d
be the net power injections vector. We make use of
the DC approximation, which is commonly used in high-
voltage transmission system analysis [37], to model the
relationship between active power injections p and active
line power flows f ∈ Rm, which is given by the linear
8Dataset N ntail αˆ(xˆmin) xˆmin KS p-value
US city sizes, 2000 Census (×103) 19447 580 1.37± 0.08 52.5± 11.6 0.76
US blackout sizes, form OE-417 (×103) 1341 448 1.31± 0.08 140± 31.3 0.32
Table I: PLFIT statistics for US city and blackout sizes. ntail is the number of data points xi ≥ xˆmin. Standard deviations
obtained via nonparametric bootstrap with 1000 repetitions.
(a) Pareto tail behavior of US city and blackout sizes in the
region x > xmin. Estimates for α and xmin, along with
standard deviations, are based on PLFIT [25]. Points
represent the empirical complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF); Solid line represents the
CCDF of a Pareto distribution with parameters α, xmin.
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(b) Visualization of the estimated α, obtained by only taking
into consideration values in the region x > xmin, as a function
of xmin. The PLFIT-estimated xmin for city sizes (blue dot)
and blackout sizes (red dot) lie within a region where the
values of α are relatively stable, substantiating the results of
the PLFIT procedure.
Figure 5: Pareto tail behavior of US city and blackout sizes.
mapping
f = V(g− d). (9)
The matrix V ∈ Rm×n is known as the Power Transfer
Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix and is constructed
as outlined below.
PTDF matrix
Choosing an arbitrary but fixed orientation of the trans-
mission lines, the network structure is described by the
edge-vertex incidence matrix C ∈ Rm×n defined as
C`,i =

1 if ` = (i, j),
−1 if ` = (j, i),
0 otherwise.
Denote by β` > 0 the weight of edge ` ∈ L, corre-
sponding to the susceptance of that transmission line.
Note that β` = x−1` , where x` is the reactance of line
`. Denote by B the m ×m diagonal matrix defined as
B = diag(β1, . . . , βm). The network topology and weights
are simultaneously encoded in the weighted Laplacian ma-
trix of the graph G, defined as L = C>BC or entry-wise
as
Li,j =
{
−βi,j if i 6= j,∑
k 6=j βi,k if i = j.
All the rows of L sum up to zero and thus the matrix L
is singular.
According to the DC approximation, the relation be-
tween any zero-sum vector of power injections p ∈ Rn and
the phase angles θ ∈ Rn can be written in matrix form
as p = Lθ. Defining L+ ∈ Rn×n as the Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse of L, we can rewrite this as
θ = L+p. (10)
The line power flows f are related to the phase angles θ
via the linear relation f = BCθ. In view of (10), the line
power flows f can be written as a linear transformation
of the power injections p, i.e.
f = Vp, (11)
where V := BCL+ is the PTDF matrix.
The following lemma is based on a well-known result
in graph theory (see, for example, [46]).
9Lemma .1 If G is a connected graph, rk (V) = rk (C) =
rk (L) = rk (L+) = n− 1, and the null space of V is the
one-dimensional subspace generated by e = (1, . . . , 1) ∈
Rn, i.e.
Ker (V) = Ker (C) = Ker (L) = Ker (L+) =< e > .
The following lemmas are technical results which will
be needed in Section .
Lemma .2 Changing the orientation of a subset of lines
L′ ⊂ L has the effect of swapping the sign of the cor-
responding rows of the PTDF matrix V. In particular,
it is always possible to choose the orientation such that
Ve1 ≥ 0.
Proof. Changing the orientation of a line from lk =
(i, j) to l˜k = (j, i), by definition, amounts to swapping
the sign of the k-th row of matrix C, yielding a modified
matrix C˜ = I(k)C, where I(k) is a diagonal matrix with
I
(k)
ii = 1 if i 6= k and I(k)kk = −1. Since L˜ = C˜>C˜ =
C>I(k)I(k)C = C>C = L, the matrices L and L+ are not
affected by the change. As a consequence, the modified
PTDF matrix V = BC˜L+ = I(k)V differs from V only
by the swapped signs on the k-th row.
Lemma .3 Let G be assigned the orientation such
that the set of edges incident to node 1 is L1 =
{(1, j) | j is adjacent to 1}, i.e. C`,1 = 1 = −C`,j for all
` = (1, j) ∈ L1. Then, V`,1 ≥ 0 for every ` ∈ L1. The
converse is also true.
Proof. First, note that largest element in each row of L+
is its diagonal entry (Corollary 1 in [47]), i.e. L+1,1−L+1,j ≥
0 for every ` = (1, j) ∈ L1. For any line ` = (1, j) ∈ L1,
we have V`,1 = (CL+)`,1 = C`,1L+1,1 + C`,jL+1,j , where
C`,1 = −C`,j = ±1 depending on the orientation of line `.
Thus, V`,1 ≥ 0 if and only if C`,1 = 1 = −C`,j .
Optimal Power Flow
The Optimal Power Flow (OPF) program is an opti-
mization problem that determines the generation sched-
ule minimizing the total system generation cost while
satisfying demand/supply balance and network physical
constraints. In its full generality, the OPF is a nonlinear,
nonconvex optimization problem. For the purpose of this
paper, we will focus on a tractable approximation based
on the DC power flow equations referred to as DC-OPF,
which can be formulated as the following optimization
problem:
min
g∈Rn
n∑
i=1
Ci(gi) (12)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
gi =
n∑
i=1
di, (13)
g
i
≤ gi ≤ g¯i, i ∈ N , (14)
−f¯` ≤ V`(g − d) ≤ f¯`, ` ∈ L, (15)
Ci(·) : R→ R denotes the cost function of generation
at node i, g, g¯ ∈ Rn denote, respectively, the vector of
nodal minimum and maximum generation capacities, and
f¯ ∈ Rm denotes the vector of line limits. We assume that
Ci(·) is an increasing quadratic function. Specifically,
we assume Ci(gi) = g2i /2, i = 1, ..., n. For the purpose
of this work, we do not consider generator limits, i.e.
g
i
= −∞, g¯i =∞, i = 1, ..., n.
Power flow redistribution
In the event of the failure of a subset of transmission
lines L′ ⊂ L, and provided that the power injections re-
main unchanged, the power flows will redistribute among
the remaining lines according to power flow physics, pro-
vided that the altered graph G˜ = (N ,L \ L′) remained
connected. The way the power flows redistribute is gov-
erned by the new PTDF matrix V˜, which can be con-
structed analogously to V, mapping the (unchanged)
power injections to the new power flows. We assume that
the redistribution occurs instantaneously, without any
transient effects.
As an illustration, we show how the redistributed power
flows can be calculated in the special case of an isolated
failure L′ = {`}. In this case, it is enough to calculate the
vector φ(`) ∈ Rm−1 of redistribution coefficients, known
as line outage distribution factors. The quantity φ(`)j takes
values in [−1, 1], and |φ(`)j | represents the percentage of
power flowing in line ` that is redirected to line j after the
failure of the former. In particular, the new power flow
configuration after the failure of line ` = (i, j), denoted
by f (`) ∈ Rm−1, is given by
f
(`)
k = fk + f
(`)
` φ
(`)
k , ∀` 6= k, (16)
where, for k = (a, b) and ` = (i, j), the coefficient φk,` ∈ R
can be computed as
φk,` = φ(i,j),(a,b) = β−1` ·
Ra,j −Ra,i +Rb,i −Rb,j
2(1− x−1i,jRi,j)
, (17)
where Ri,j is the effective resistance between nodes i and
j, given by
Ri,j = (ei−ej)TL+(ei−ej) = (L+)i,i+(L+)j,j−2(L+)i,j .
.
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CASCADING FAILURE MODEL
In view of the DC-OPF, in order to obtain a funda-
mental understanding of the correlation between blackout
sizes and city sizes using the DC approximation model,
we require a framework that adequately sets the power
demand, the transmission line limits, generation limits,
and the cost function for any fixed topology G = (N ,L).
In addition, we need to specify a mechanism that causes
the initial line failure, as well as which lines possibly fail
next after the power flow redistribution. For this purpose,
we consider a framework that consists of three problems:
the planning problem, the operational problem, and the
emergency problem. Next, we explain our framework in
more detail, followed by listing some vital properties.
Description of the framework
The planning problem refers to how the generation lim-
its, the line limits and power demand are determined with
respect to the city sizes X1, ..., Xn. We assume that each
node represents a city with size Xi inhabitants. For ease
of presentation, we consider a framework with a static
setting where each inhabitant demands one unit of energy,
i.e. di = Xi for every i = 1, ..., n. We assume that the
cost function is an increasing quadratic function and that
generator limits do not pose an effective constraint in the
DC-OPF. In other words, Ci(gi) = g2i /2, i = 1, ..., n, and
g
i
= −∞, g¯i =∞, i = 1, ..., n. The line limits are set as a
fraction of the absolute power flow in a setting where also
the line limits pose no effective constraint. More specifi-
cally, in the absence of any generator and transmission line
limits, it is easy to see that the solution of the DC-OPF
is g(planning) = 1n
∑n
i=1Xie. The associated flow vector is
given by f (planning) = V(g(planning) −X) = −VX, where
we used that Vg∗ = 0 (Lemma .1). For a safety loading
factor λ ∈ [0, 1], referred as loading factor in the rest, the
operational line limits are set as
f¯j = λ |(VX)j |, j = 1, ...,m. (18)
In the operational problem, we solve the DC-OPF for
an increasing quadratic cost function and line limits as
in (18) to obtain the generation vector g. That is, we
solve
min
g∈Rn
n∑
i=1
g2i /2 (19)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
gi =
n∑
i=1
Xi, (20)
VX− λ |VX| ≤ Vg ≤VX + λ |VX| , (21)
where |VX| denotes the vector with elements (|VX|)j =
|(VX)j |, j = 1, ...,m.
Finally, in the emergency problem, we focus on the
failure process after an initial disturbance. We assume
that the initial failure is caused by a single line failure,
chosen uniformly at random over all lines. We point out
that our framework can be extended to multiple initial
line failures, or adapted to deal with generator failures.
The initial failure may cause a cascading effect that leads
to multiple line failures that disintegrate the network. A
consecutive line failure occurs whenever there is at least
one line such that its emergency line limit is exceeded.
That is, instead of considering the conservatively chosen
operational line limits f¯`, we take the line limits to be F` =
λ∗f¯` for some constant λ∗ > 1. A canonical choice is λ∗ =
1/λ. We assume that line failures occur subsequently, and
occurs at the line where its relative exceedance is largest.
Whenever line failures cause the network to disconnect
in multiple islands, we assume that the energy balance is
restored by proportionally lowering either generation or
demand at all nodes. Naturally, this alters the line power
flows. More specifically, before the initial disturbance
occurs, the network flows are given by V(g−X), where g
is the solution of the DC-OPF in the operational problem.
After any line failure, we check whether this causes the
network to disconnect, and if so, we proportionally lower
the generation in one component and the demand in
the other component such that demand and generation
are balanced in the two disconnected components. The
network flows are updated according to the laws of physics
in every component. That is, the removal of one or
more lines yields a modified matrix V˜ (see Section ), and
possibly modified generation g˜ and demand d˜. The line
flows are given by V˜(g˜−d˜). This cascading failure process
continues until the line limits F` of all surviving lines are
sufficient to carry the power flows.
This iterative process leads to a network having discon-
nected sets. We make the convention that A1 is the set
of nodes that contains the city with the largest demand
after the cascade has taken place. We point out that the
set A1 is random, and in particular, A1 = {1, ..., n} if the
cascade stops without causing network disconnections.
Whenever the network disintegrates in multiple com-
ponents, we alter the generation and demand to restore
the power balance in every component. We approximate
the total of load that is shed or equivalently, the number
of customers affected by the blackout, by the mismatch
between generation and demand in the component con-
taining the city with highest power demand, defined as
S =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈A1
(Xi − gi)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (22)
Due to properties of the Pareto distribution, this turns
out to be a good approximation as it yields exactly the
same limiting behavior. We study this notion in more
detail in the next sections.
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Principle of a single city with large demand
A vital property in our framework is that the only likely
way to have a large blackout is when there is a single
city that has a large power demand. To formalize this
notion, write d1 = max{d1, ..., dn} with di, i = 1, ..., n
independent and identically Pareto distributed power
demands. Note that for every  > 0,
P (S > x) =
P
(
S > x;
n∑
i=2
di < d1
)
+ P
(
S > x;
n∑
i=2
di ≥ d1
)
.
It turns out that we can show that (in certain settings)
the first term on the right-hand side has a Pareto tail,
and the second term is negligible. More specifically, the
following result can be shown.
Lemma .4 Suppose di, i = 1, ..., n are independent and
identically Pareto distributed with tail exponent α > 0,
and write d1 = max{d1, ..., dn}. For every  > 0, as
x→∞,
P
(
S > x;
n∑
i=2
di ≥ d1
)
= O
(
x−2α
)
. (23)
Proof. We observe that the total mismatch can never
exceed the sum of all demands, and hence
S ≤
n∑
i=1
di ≤ nd1.
Therefore,
P
(
S > x; di >
n∑
i=2
di ≥ d1
)
≤P
(
d1 >
x
n
; di > 
d1
n
for some i = 2, ..., n
)
≤P
(
di > 
x
n2
for some i = 2, ..., n
)
Write I(y) = |{i : di > y}|. Since for every η > 0,
P (I(ηx) ≥ 2) = O (x−2α)
as x→∞, the result follows.
In other words, Lemma .4 implies that if for some  > 0
sufficiently small,
P
(
S > x;
n∑
i=2
di < d1
)
∼ Cx−α
holds for some constant C ∈ (0,∞), then the only likely
way to have a large blackout is when there is a single city
that has a large demand.
Closed-form solution for the operational OPF in the
case d = e1.
Note that without loss of generality, we can always
normalize our framework by dividing all parameters (e.g.
generation, line limits, etc.) by the sum of all power
demands. This yields an equivalent setting where the
total power demand equals one. In view of Lemma .4,
it is sensible to consider the special case where d = e1.
That is, node 1, henceforth referred to as the sink node,
has unit demand, while all other nodes have zero demand.
For this special case, a closed-form solution exists for the
generation vector in the operational OPF.
First, we consider the planning problem. As stated in
the model description, in the absence of any generator
and transmission line limits, the solution of the planning
OPF is g∗ = 1ne, with associated flow vector f∗ = V(g∗−
e1) = −Ve1, where we used that Vg∗ = 0 (Lemma .1).
Therefore, the operational problem (12)-(15) reduces to
min
g∈Rn
n∑
i=1
g2i /2 (24)
s.t. e>g = e>e1 = 1, (25)
−λ|Ve1| ≤ V(g− d) ≤ λ|Ve1|, (26)
which we will denote by P (λ). Lemma .5 shows that the
solution of P (λ) is of closed form.
Lemma .5 Let λ ∈ (0, 1). Let G be assigned the orien-
tation such that Ve1 ≥ 0. Then, the solution of P (λ) is
given by
g(λ) = λ 1
n
e + (1− λ)e1,
i.e. g1(λ) = 1−λn−1n and gi(λ) = λ 1n for all i = 2, . . . , n.
The corresponding line flows are at capacity and are given
by f(λ) = −λVe1.
Proof. First, we note that the selected orientation
on G implies that the set of edges incident to node 1 is
L1 = {(1, j) | j is adjacent to 1} (i.e. the edges in L1 exit
node 1), or, in terms of the edge-node incidence matrix
C, that C`,1 = 1 = −C`,j for all ` = (1, j) ∈ L1. This is
proved in Lemma .3 in Section .
Due to the chosen orientation, f¯(λ) = λ |Ve1| = λVe1
and the line limit constraints in P (λ) can be rewritten as
(1− λ)Ve1 ≤ Vg ≤ (1 + λ)Ve1.
The problem P (λ) is a strictly convex optimization prob-
lem with linear equality and inequality constraints. There-
fore, in order to show that g(λ) is the unique optimal
solution, it is sufficient to show that it satisfies the KKT
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conditions for P (λ), which read
g + V>(µ+ − µ−) + γe = 0, (27)
µ+ ≥ 0,µ− ≥ 0, , (28)
µ+l (Vg− (1 + λ)Ve1)` = 0∀` ∈ L, (29)
µ−l (−Vg + (1− λ)Ve1)` = 0∀` ∈ L, (30)
e>g = 1, (31)
(1− λ)Ve1 ≤ Vg ≤ (1 + λ)Ve1, (32)
where γ is the Lagrange multipliers for the equality con-
straint and µ+,µ− ∈ Rm are the Lagrange multipliers
for the inequality constraints.
Since Vg(λ) = (1 − λ)Ve1 and e>g(λ) = e>e1 = 1,
the candidate solution g(λ) clearly satisfies the feasibility
conditions (31),(32) and the complementary slackness
condition (30). Moreover, condition (29) is satisfied if we
choose µ+ = 0.
Using the facts that Vg(λ) = (1 − λ)Ve1 and
Ker(V) =< e >, pre-multiplying equation (27) by V
yields (1− λ)e1 + V>µ ∈ Ker(V). This is equivalent to
(1− λ)e1 + V>µ = (1− λ)
n
e,
where in the last equality we used again the property that
Ve = 0. To conclude the proof, it remains to be shown
that that there exist a nonnegative solution µ− ≥ 0 of
the matrix equation
V>(−µ−) = (1− λ)(e/n− e1). (33)
We construct a non-negative solution µ− as follows:
µ−` := (1− λ)eL1 =
{
(1− λ) l ∈ L1
0 l /∈ L1,
,
where eL1 is am- dimensional vector containing ones in po-
sitions given by L1, and 0 elsewhere. Invoking Lemma .3
we see that Ce1 = eL1 , yielding µ− = (1− λ)Ce1. Using
the definition of V = CL+,L = C>C, and the property
L+L = (I− J/n) (see [47]), we observe that Eq. (33) is
indeed satisfied:
V>µ− = −(1− λ)V>µ− = −(1− λ)V>Ce1
= −(1− λ)(L+L)e1 = (1− λ)(e/n− e1).
Setting γ = −1/n completes the proof.
Finally, we solve the emergency problem. Observe that
whenever there is a network disconnection, the component
that does not contain node 1 has no power demand, and
hence the generation at every node in that component is
reduced to zero. Evidently, no consecutive failures occur
in this component. On the other hand, the demand at
node 1 is reduced by the number of nodes that disconnect
from this component times λ/n. Therefore, the total
amount of load that is shed is exactly equal to the total
amount of reduced power generation at node 1 (power
imbalance), which is given by
S =
∑
i6∈A1
λ
n
= λ(n− |A1|)
n
. (34)
Naturally, the way the failure process cascades through
the network after the initial disturbance is highly depen-
dent on the network topology. The redistribution of power
flow takes place as described in Section , and we stress
that this is a deterministic process. In this special case,
the only sources of randomness come from the choice of
the initial line failure, and possibly the choice of subse-
quent line failure whenever the redistribution of power
flow causes the relative exceedance to be the same at
multiple lines. Therefore, given a network topology and
the line that initially fails, we can determine exactly how
the failure process propagates through the network.
It may be apparent from Lemma .4 that this special case
where d = e1 describes some form of limiting behavior.
That is, as Lemma .4 holds for every  > 0, we observe
that the normalized demand vector d converges to the
unit vector e1 as  ↓ 0. Next, we show that for almost all
values of λ, for all demand vectors d for which d → e1
as  ↓ 0, the order at which line failures occur converges
to the sequence of line failures as if the demand vector
would have been d = e1.
Convergence of cascade sequence
The operational OPF
min
g∈Rn
1
2g
>g (35)
s.t. e>g = e>d, (36)
|V(g− d)| ≤ λ |Vd| , (37)
is a strictly convex optimization problem, and since g =
λd¯e + (1− λ)d is a feasible point, the feasible set of this
optimization problem is nonempty. Therefore, for each
demand vector d, there exists a unique optimal solution
g∗(d).
If we view d as a parameter of the problem, then (35)-
(37) is an instance of a multi-parametric quadratic pro-
gramming (mp-QP) problem with a strictly convex ob-
jective function, for which it is known that the optimal
solution g∗(d) is a continuous function of the parameter
vector d (Theorem 1, [48]). This continuity property will
be used extensively in the rest of this section.
We assume in our framework that line failures occur
subsequently, i.e. a next line failure occurs at the line
where the line limit is relatively most exceeded. Recall
that Fj denotes the emergency line limit of line j ∈ L,
and is given by (taking λ∗ = 1λ )
Fj = λ∗λ|(Vd)j | = |(Vd)j |.
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We write f (m)j as the flow on line j after the failure of the
first m− 1 lines and after the load/generation shedding
took place, where we use the convention that f (1)j denotes
the flow on line j when no initial disturbance has occurred
yet, and f (m)j = 0 if line j has already failed before the
m-th step of the cascading failure process. The cascade is
initiated by the random failure of line ` = `(1). The m-th
line to fail, for m ≥ 2, is given by
`(m) = arg max
j∈A(m)
{ |f (m)j | − Fj
Fj
}
= arg max
j∈A(m)
{ |f (m)j |
Fj
}
,
(38)
where A(m) = {j : |f (m)j | ≥ Fj} is the set of lines that
exceed the limit.
Remark .6 Note that the line limits and line flows de-
pend on d and λ through the operational OPF, so that
the sequence of subsequent failure depends on d, λ, and
on the initial failure ` = `(1). That is,
Fj = Fj(d), f (m)j = f
(m)
j (d, λ),A(m) = A(m)(`, λ,d),
`(m) = `(m)(`, λ,d).
For the sake of exposition, we do not write the dependency
on d, λ and `.
Let C = {`(1), . . . , `(T )} be a cascade sequence, where
`(T ) is the last failure before the cascade stops. Such a
sequence is uniquely determined by the first failure `(1)
and by the demand vector d and by λ, i.e. C = C(d, λ, `).
In view of Lemma .4 and the normalization property, the
goal of this section is to show that if d → e1, then the
cascade sequence does not depend on d anymore, i.e.
C(d, λ, `) = C(e1, λ, `) if d→ e1.
We observe that if |A(m)| = 0, no more line failures
occur. Technically, it is also possible that |A(m)| > 1 and
hence the subsequent line failure next needs to be chosen
out of a set of multiple lines. We exclude the cases that
do not yield unique maximizers from our framework.
Assumption .7 For all lines j, the ratios between redis-
tributed flows and line limits
|f (m)j (e1)|
Fj(e1)
= λ|(V
(m)e1)j |
|(Ve1)j |
are all different for all m ≥ 2, where V(m) denotes the
PTDF matrix for the remaining network after m − 1
failures have taken place. This assumption is needed to
ensure the uniqueness of the maximizer in (38).
This assumption ensures that whenever the first line fail-
ure ` and the parameter λ is known, the cascade sequence
is unique and deterministic for demand vector d = e1.
This assumption is for technical convenience, and we
stress that our results hold more generally. In particular,
this assumption rules out certain network topologies with
some form of symmetry, but we can slightly adapt the
framework to deal with these cases as well.
That is, suppose that |A(m)| > 1 for some m ∈ N
and the set A(m) consists only of lines that are indistin-
guishable from one another (lines that are ‘symmetric’).
Since nodal demands are independent and identically dis-
tributed, this implies that each of these lines has an equal
probability of being the line that fails next. By the sym-
metry of the network topology, regardless of which line
is chosen to fail next, the resulting networks after the
cascade are indistinguishable. We illustrate this notion
for the 6-node example in the next section.
To analyze the power imbalance in this framework, we
need to introduce some notation as well as formally define
the shedding rule and the redistribution of power flows.
Definition .8 (Uniform shedding rule) Let g(1) =
g∗,d(1) = d be the initial generation and demand vectors.
Assume that the removal of lines `(1), . . . , `(m), m ≥ 1, dis-
connects the network in components G(m)i = (N (m)i ,L(m)i ),
i = 1, . . . , hm. Define the power imbalance in component
G(m)i as
YG(m)
i
=
∑
k∈N (m)
i
(g(m)k − d(m)k ).
In order to re-achieve power balance, generation and de-
mand in each component are modified iteratively according
to the following uniform shedding rule, for k ∈ N (m)i :
d
(m+1)
k =

(
1−
YG(m)
i∑
l∈N(m)
i
d
(m)
l
)
d
(m)
k if YG(m)
i
< 0
d
(m)
k if YG(m)
i
≥ 0
,
g
(m+1)
k =

g
(m)
k if YG(m)
i
< 0(
1−
YG(m)
i∑
l∈N(m)
i
g
(m)
l
)
g
(m)
k if YG(m)
i
≥ 0
Definition .9 (Power flow redistribution) Assume
that the removal of lines `(1), . . . , `(m), m ≥ 1, discon-
nects the network in components G(m)i = (N (m)i ,L(m)i ),
i = 1, . . . , hm. Then, the line flows in component G(m)i
are given by
f
(m+1)
Li = V
(m+1,Gi)(g(m+1)Ni − d
(m+1)
Ni ),
where V(m+1,Gi) is the PTDF matrix for the subgraph
G(m)i , and g(m+1)Ni , d
(m+1)
Ni are defined as in Definition .8.
A second assumption we require to show the conver-
gence of the cascade sequence involves the following.
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Assumption .10 For all lines j and m ≥ 2,
|f (m)j (e1)| − Fj(e1) 6= 0.
That is, for d = e1 it is not possible for a line flow |f (m)j |
to be exactly equal to its limit. In terms of PTDF matrices
and λ, this assumption reads
λ|(V(m,Gi)e1)j | 6= |(Ve1)j |, m ≥ 2.
This assumption means that we exclude finitely many λ-s
from our analysis, which correspond to phase-transitions.
Assumption .10 states that none of the line flows equal
its emergency line limit in the cascade sequence if d = e1.
In order to prove the convergence of the cascade sequence,
we also need a continuity property of the line flows at
every stage with respect to the demand vector.
Lemma .11 (Continuity of f (m)j with respect to d)
At each stage m of the cascade, the redistributed power
flows f (m)j are continuous in the initial demand vector d
for all j = 1, ...,m.
Proof. Assume that the removal of lines `(1), . . . , `(m),
m ≥ 1, disconnects the network in components G(m)i =
(N (m)i ,L(m)i ), i = 1, . . . , hm. According to Definition .9,
f
(m+1)
Li = V
(m+1,Gi)(g(m+1)Ni − d
(m+1)
Ni ),
for each connected component G(m)i , so f (m+1) is con-
tinuous in g(m+1),d(m+1). Moreover, according to Def-
inition .8, g(m+1),d(m+1) are continuous functions of
g(m),d(m). By unfolding the recursion, and using that
g∗(d) is continuous in d, we see that f (m+1) is continuous
in d.
Finally, we can show the main result of this section.
Proposition .12 Assume that Assumptions .7 and .10
hold, and let C(d, λ, `) = {`(1), . . . , `(T )} be a cascade
sequence initiated by ` = `(1). Then, there exists a  > 0
such that
d1 = 1, dj < , ∀j ≥ 2 =⇒ C(d, λ, `) = C(e1, λ, `).
Proof.
Let `(1) be the first failure, and consider
`(2) = arg max
j∈A(2)
{ |f (2)j |
Fj
}
,
where A(2) = A(2)(d, λ) = {j : |f (2)j | ≥ Fj}. Lemma .11
shows that f (2)j (d)→ f (2)j (e1) as d→ e1, so by continuity
and Assumption .10
|f (2)j (d)| − Fj(d)→ |f (2)j (e1)| − Fj(e1) 6= 0.
Consequently, there exist  > 0 such that, if dj <  for all
j ≥ 2, then
|f (2)j (d)| > Fj(d) ⇐⇒ |f (2)j (e1)| > Fj(e1).
In other words, a line limits is exceeded for d = e1 (which,
due to our assumption, implies that it is strictly exceeded)
if and only if it is also (strictly) exceeded when d is close
enough to e1, implying that A(2)(d) = A(2)(e1) .
Moreover, there exists a (1) ≤  such that, if dk < 
for k ≥ 2, then
max
j∈A(2)(d1,λ)
|f (2)j (d, λ)|
Fj(d)
= max
j∈A(2)(e1,λ)
|f (2)j (d, λ)|
Fj(d)
= max
j∈A(2)(e1,λ)
|f (2)j (e1, λ)|
Fj(e1)
,
where in the second equality we used that A(2)(d) =
A(2)(e1), and in the third equality we used again conti-
nuity. Finally, Assumption .7 allows us to conclude that
the max is unique and that the (unique) second failure
`(2)(d, λ) = `(2)(e1, λ) does not depend on d if dk < (1),
k ≥ 2.
As Lemma .11 holds for every stage of the cascade,
we can repeat the steps above to construct a sequence
(T ) ≤ . . . , (2) ≤ (1) such that the cascade sequence C is
well defined and does not depend on d if dj < (T ) for all
j ≥ 2.
Example .13 To illustrate how one can easily derive
the phase-transition values, we consider the 4-node cycle
topology. With the standard clock-wise orientation, we
have
V(clock) = 18

3 −3 −1 1
1 3 −3 −1
−1 1 3 −3
−3 −1 1 3.
 .
For d1  d2, d3, d4, we can change the orientation
such that Vd ≥ 0, which is given by the edgelist
{(1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 3), (1, 4)}. Then the matrix V reads
V = diag(s)V(clock) = 18

3 −3 −1 1
1 3 −3 −1
1 −1 −3 3
3 1 −1 −3,
 ,
where s = sign(V(clock)e1) = [1, 1,−1,−1]. In this case,
φk,` = −sk =
{
−1 if k ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 3)}
1 if k ∈ {(4, 3), (1, 4)} .
Assume that the first failure is ` = (1, 2), so that the
power flow redistribution is
λ ((Ve1)k + φk,`(Ve1)`) = λ·

1/4 if k = (2, 3)
−1/2 if k = (4, 3)
−3/4 if k = (1, 4)}
.
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Then, the critical values of λ are given by
λ = ± (Ve1)k(Ve1)k + φk,`(Ve1)` , k 6= `, (39)
and we find that they are λ = 14 ,
1
2 .
Moreover, if λ < 14 then the cascade stops immediately
after the failure of the first line. If 14 < λ <
1
2 , then line
(4, 3) fails afterwards and if λ > 12 lines (2, 3), (4, 3), (1, 4)
fails afterwards. Therefore, λ = 14 ,
1
2 can be seen as
phase-transition points.
Asymptotic behavior of power imbalance
In the previous sections, we showed that the only likely
way to have a large blackout is when there is a single city
that has a significantly larger demand than all other cities.
Under certain assumptions, given the position of this city
(i.e. labeling this as city 1) and the first line failure, the
cascade sequence is deterministic and the same to the
one as if the demand vector would have been d = e1. We
exploit these properties to derive the tail behavior of S, or
equivalently, the amount of load that is shed/the number
of affected customers.
We point out that the demands are independent and
identically distributed, so the probability that a city has
the largest demand equals 1/n. To obtain the tail behav-
ior of S, we need that Assumptions .7 and .10 to hold
regardless of which city has the largest power demand.
Assumption .14 Assumptions .7 and .10 hold for any
relabeling of the vertices.
Note that since the number of cities n is finite, and
inherently also the number of the possible lines where the
first failure occurs, Assumption .14 excludes only a finite
number of possible values of λ from our framework. The
main theorem follows.
Theorem .15 Suppose there is a fixed topology G =
(N ,L) and a fixed λ ∈ (0, 1), for which Assumption .14
holds. Write Z(i, `), i = 1, ..., n, ` = 1, ...,m as the num-
ber of cities that are not in the same component as city i
after the cascade under demand vector d = ei and first line
failure `. If Z(i, `) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and ` = 1, ...,m,
then as x→∞,
P(S > x) = O(x−2α). (40)
Otherwise, as x→∞, there exists a C ∈ (0,∞) such that
P(S > x) ∼ Cx−α. (41)
Proof. First, since the demands are independent and
identically distributed, we observe that each city has an
equal probability of being the city with the largest demand.
That is, if B denotes the city that has the largest demand,
then
P(B = i) = 1/n, i = 1, ..., n.
By the law of total probability,
P (S > x) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
P
(
S > x
∣∣B = i) .
Fix some  > 0 (sufficiently small), and note that for all
i = 1, ...n,
P
(
S > x
∣∣B = i) = P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣B = i

+ P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj ≥ di
∣∣B = i
 .
Due to Lemma .4, we observe that the second is of order
O(x−2α) for all i = 1, ..., n, and hence
n∑
i=1
1
n
P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj ≥ di
∣∣B = i
 = O(x−2α).
For the first term, note that Assumption .14 ensures that
Z(i, `) is well-defined for all i = 1, ..., n and ` = 1, ...,m.
Since we choose our first failure uniformly at random
among all lines, we observe that by law of total probability,
for all i = 1, ..., n,
P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣B = i

=
m∑
l=1
1
m
P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = l, B = i
 .
In case that Z(i, `) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and
` = 1, ...,m, it follows from Proposition .12 that for all
 > 0 sufficiently small, the cascade sequence causes no
disconnections for every city with largest demand and first
line failure `(1). That is, for all i = 1, ..., n, l = 1, ...,m,
x > 0 and  > 0 sufficiently small,
P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = l, B = i
 = 0.
Therefore, if Z(i, `) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n and ` = 1, ...,m,
then for all  > 0 sufficiently small,
n∑
i=1
1
n
P
S > x; n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣B = i
 = 0,
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and we conclude that (40) holds.
Next, suppose that Z(i, `) 6= 0 for at least some
i ∈ {1, ..., n} and ` ∈ {1, ...,m}. It follows from Proposi-
tion .12 that for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and ` ∈ {1, ...,m} for
which Z(i, `) 6= 0, it holds for all  > 0 sufficiently small
that the cascade sequence is the same as the one when
the demand vector would have been d = ei. In particular,
whenever
∑n
j 6=i dj < di, it holds for all  > 0 sufficiently
small that the set A1 is deterministic and is the same set
of nodes as if demand would have been d = ei, and the
number of cities disconnected from city i equals Z(i, `).
Recall Lemma .5 and the property that the generator
vector g is a continuous function of d. Consequently, for
all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and ` ∈ {1, ...,m} for which holds that
Z(i, `) 6= 0, and for all  > 0 sufficiently small,
P
(
S > x,
n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = `, B = i)
=P
(∑
i 6∈A1
(gi − di) > x,
n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = `, B = i)
≤P
(
Z(i, `)
(
λ
n
+ c1()
)
di > x,
n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = `, B = i) ,
where c1() is a strictly positive function with c1()→ 0
as  ↓ 0. For independent identically Pareto-distributed
random variables X1, ..., Xn, it holds that as x→∞,
P (max{X1, ..., Xn} ≥ x) ∼ nP(Xi > x) = nKx−α.
Therefore, for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and ` ∈ {1, ...,m} for
which Z(i, `) 6= 0,
lim
↓0
lim
x→∞x
αP
S > x, n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = `, B = i

≤ lim
↓0
n
(
Z(i, `)
(
λ
n
+ c1()
))α
=nK
(
Z(i, `)λ
n
)α
.
Similarly, we can obtain the same lower bound, i.e.
lim
↓0
lim
x→∞x
αP
S > x, n∑
j 6=i
dj < di
∣∣ `(1) = `, B = i

≥nK
(
Z(i, `)λ
n
)α
.
We conclude that as x→∞,
P (S > x) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
l=1
K
m
(
Z(i, `)λ
n
)α
x−α.
Note that term in front of x−α is a double sum of finitely
many terms, and hence we can also conclude that (41)
holds.
CASCADE ANALYSIS FOR 6-NODE TOPOLOGY
To illustrate how to derive the asymptotic behavior of
the amount of load that is shed using our framework, we
consider a network topology that consists of six nodes
and eight lines as illustrated in the main paper. It follows
from our results that in order to understand the behavior
for large blackouts, it suffices to consider the behavior
under unit demand vectors. Due to the highly symmet-
ric structure of the network topology in this example,
there are only two relevant options for the position of the
city with the highest demand, as is illustrated in Fig. 6.
The red node represents the city that has unit demand
(largest), while the other nodes have zero demand. Note
that case A and B occur with probability 1/3 and 2/3,
respectively. In each case, one can solve the operational
problem to determine the emergency line limits, which are
also depicted in Fig. 6. We illustrate how the cascading
failure processes evolve in these cases next.
5
24
5
24
5
24
5
24
1
24
1
24
1
24
1
24
(a) Case A: the city with
the largest demand is one
of two cities that connect
to four other cities.
5
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
5
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
(b) Case B: the city with
the largest demand is one
of four cities that connect
to two other cities.
Figure 6: Line limits in the 6-node example.
Case A
The first line failure is chosen uniformly at random
among all eight lines. Again, due to the symmetries
of the network topology, we only need to consider two
possibilities: when the first failure occurs at a top lines,
or when it occurs at one of the bottom lines. Fig. 7
illustrates the possible cascade when the initial failure is
at a top line. The possible subsequent line failure occurs
at the line for which the ratio of flow and line limit is
largest, and therefore these values are depicted next to all
(remaining) lines in Fig. 7. Only if the maximum ratio
is strictly larger than one, another line fails. If the ratio
is less than one, no consecutive line failure occurs, and if
it equals one, then it corresponds to a phase-transition
case.
In Fig. 7, we observe that after the initial failure at
a top line, the ratio of flow and line limit is highest at
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4
5
λ 6
5
λ 6
5
λ
2λ 2λ
(c) Step 3.
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(e) Step 5.
Figure 7: First line failure occurs at a top line.
the corresponding bottom line. The ratio is 4λ, and
hence λ = 1/4 is the first phase-transition value that
we observe. If λ < 1/4 the cascade ends immediately,
otherwise this line fails. In step 2 (which is relevant
for all value of λ > 1/4), we observe that the bottom
lines all have the same maximum ratio of 4/3λ, which
implies that Assumption .7 is violated in this example.
Yet, demands are independent and identically distributed,
and the symmetric structure of this network topology
ensures that each of the remaining bottom lines have equal
probability to fail next. This explains why Assumption .7
is too restrictive, and why our framework can deal with
network topologies that have these types of symmetries as
well. That is, regardless of the actual line that is chosen
to fail next, the networks that appear in the next stages of
the cascade are indistinguishable from one another. The
second step also yields the second phase-transition value:
if 1/4 < λ < 3/4, then no consecutive failure occur, and
if λ > 3/4 another bottom line fails. In the latter case,
also step 3 and step 4 are observed, where the network
turns stable at step 5.
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(a) First steps.
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(b) Network after cascade.
Figure 8: First line failure at a bottom line
2
3
λ
2
3
λ
2
3
λ
2λ
8
3
λ
8
3
λ
8
3
λ
(a) Initial failure.
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(d) Step 4.
Figure 9: First line failure at a top line.
If the first line failure occurs at a bottom line, then the
corresponding top line is stable, and a possible subsequent
failure occurs at one of the three remaining bottom lines.
Again, consecutive line failures occur when λ > 3/4, and
the cascade stops if λ < 3/4. Using an analogue analysis
as in the previous case, we would end up with a network
where all bottom lines have failed, and all top lines are
intact when λ > 3/4. An illustration of this case is given
in Fig. 8.
Case B
We can perform a similar analysis in this case. Again,
due to the symmetries, there are only two truly different
possibilities for the first line failure to occur: one of the
two top lines, or one of the six other lines in Fig. 6b.
In Fig. 9 we illustrate the possible cascades if the initial
failure occurs at one of the two top lines. In this case,
the cascade only continues if λ > 3/8, and stops if λ <
3/8. That is, we observe another phase-transition value,
i.e. λ = 3/8. If λ > 3/8, then after the initial line failure
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three more line failure occurs, which after the cascade
stops. In Fig. 10 we illustrate the possible cascades if
the initial failure occurs at one of the six bottom lines.
Then, there is only a possible second line failure when
λ > 1/2, after which the cascade stops. If λ < 1/2,
the cascade stops after immediately after the initial line
failure. Consequently, we obtain λ = 1/2 as a fourth
phase-transition value.
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Figure 10: First line failure at a bottom line.
Tail behavior of blackout size
To derive the tail behavior of the total amount of load
shed, we need to determine the number of combinations
that leads to j cities disconnected from the city with
largest demand j = 0, 1, ..., n − 1. That is, we count
the number of tuples (i, `) such that Z(i, `) = j, j =
0, 1, ..., n−1, where i denotes the city label and ` the first
line failure. Since the network consists of six nodes and
eight lines, there are a total of 48 possible tuples. It follows
from the previous sections that in this example, there
are four phase-transition values of λ, namely 1/4, 3/8,
1/2 and 3/4. Therefore we need to distinguish between
five possible intervals of λ. In Table II we provide an
overview, which follows directly from the results in the
previous sections. A direct consequence is the following
corollary.
#{(i, `) : Z(i, `) = j} j = 0 j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5
0 < λ < 1/4 48 0 0 0 0 0
1/4 < λ < 3/8 40 8 0 0 0 0
3/8 < λ < 1/2 32 8 0 0 8 0
1/2 < λ < 3/4 8 32 0 0 8 0
3/4 < λ < 1 0 32 8 0 8 0
Table II: Overview of number of tuples that lead to the
disconnection of j cities from the city with largest
demand.
Corollary .16 Consider the 6-node network topology. If
λ ∈ (0, 1/4), then as x→∞,
P(S > x) ∼ O(x−2α).
Otherwise, as x→∞,
P(S > x) ∼ C(λ)Kx−α,
where
C(λ) =

(λ/6)α if 1/4 < λ < 3/8,
(λ/6)α + (2λ/3)α if 3/8 < λ < 1/2,
4 (λ/6)α + (2λ/3)α if 1/2 < λ < 3/4,
4 (λ/6)α + (λ/3)α + (2λ/3)α if 3/4 < λ < 1.
NUMERICAL VALIDATION ON SYNTHETIC
NETWORKS
Algorithm 1 Monte-Carlo simulation for synthetic net-
works
1: Inputs:
Parameters for sampling network and city sizes
Line limit scaling parameter λ ∈ (0, 1)
Number of blackout realizations niter
2: Initialize:
3: Sample network topology G and city sizes (C)
4: Solve OPF without line limits; let f∗ be the
resulting power flows (B, D)
5: Solve OPF with line limits f¯ = λ|f∗| (B, D)
6: Choose a random subset L′ of lines, with
cardinality niter
7: procedure
8: for ` in L′: do
9: Sample city sizes (A, C)
10: Solve OPF without line limits; let f∗ be the result-
ing power flows (B, D)
11: Set G.connected = True
12: Remove line ` from G
13: Set G.changed =True
14: while G.changed =True and G.connected = True
do
15: Recompute power flows (B)
16: Remove from G the line with the largest relative
overload wrt. the original line limits |f∗| , if any
17: If a line was removed, let G.changed = True;
otherwise, set G.changed = False.
18: If G is still connected, let G.connected = True;
otherwise, set G.connected = False.
19: end while
20: Shed load/generation within each component of G
to achieve power balance (load shedding event) (B)
21: Store blackout realization
22: end for
23: end procedure
In this section, we numerically validate our theory
by simulating synthetic blackouts using the three-stages
mathematical model described in Section . We use
different random graph topologies, the Watts-Strogatz
model [49] and the more recent SynGrid model developed
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in [50], as well as IEEE test cases. The Watts-Strogatz
model produces graphs with small world topologies, while
the SynGrid model produces random graphs with realistic
and statistically correct power grid topologies. With the
Watts-Strogatz model, we aim to analyze the impact of
network topology via changing the rewiring probability
p, while with the SynGrid model we study the impact of
the line limit loading factor λ.
In Sections - , we relax various assumptions upon which
our model is based, in order to test the sensitivity of the
theory. The general algorithm is summarized in Algo-
rithm 1. Steps marked with (A), (B), (C) and (D) differ
according to the particular assumption that is relaxed.
In particular, these steps control: (A) whether or not
to resample city sizes at each iteration; (B) whether to
use a DC or AC power flow model; (C) which random
graph and city size distribution to use; (D) whether to
use a convex quadratic or a convex piecewise linear cost
function in the OPF.
City sizes are sampled from both a Pareto distribution
with parameters α(d) = 1.37 and x(d)min = 5 ·104 (according
to the results in Table I), and a uniform distribution
with the same mean as the Pareto distribution. The two
different city sizes distributions are used to corroborate
our theory from different angles. On the one hand, we
show that when city sizes are heavy-tailed so are blackout
sizes and the tail indexes are similar, as predicted by
our asymptotic theory. On the other hand, when city
sizes are not heavy-tailed, we show that the blackout size
distribution is also not heavy-tailed. Each iteration of the
simulation stops when there are no more overloaded lines,
or the graph got disconnected in two islands.
The results show that our framework is robust with
respect to violations of the above-mentioned key assump-
tions, different topologies, line limit loading factors, and
city size distributions. Later, in Section , we perform
simulations on a model for the German transmission grid,
where all of the simplifying assumptions, except for the
DC flow model, are relaxed in favour of realistic parame-
ters.
Frozen city sizes
Our mathematical framework described in Section mod-
els city sizes X1, . . . , Xn as Pareto distributed random
variables, while in the real world the sizes of cities served
by a given power grid are essentially fixed. In this section,
we show that our results still hold for a version of our
model where the city sizes are kept fixed (i.e., they are not
resampled at each iteration), provided that the network
is large enough to avoid finite size effects.
With respect to Algorithm 1, step A is skipped, so that
city sizes are kept frozen throughout the simulation, and
the only source of randomness is the first outage event.
The rest of the framework is unchanged, i.e. a DC flow
model with a convex quadratic objective function is used
(steps B, D), and both a Pareto and a uniform distribution
are used for city sizes (step C).
The results are reported in Tables III, IV and Fig-
ures 12, 13. We observe that, in the Watts-Strogatz
case, the tail index estimates α are within one standard
deviation apart from the city sizes index α(d) = 1.37, con-
sistently across different values of the rewiring probability
p. The result is corroborated by the analysis of the Hill
plots in Fig. 12, where we observe that the flat region
of the graph xmin → α(xmin) is close to α(city) = 1.37.
Conversely, there is no indication of a heavy tail for the
blackout size distribution in the case of uniform city sizes,
as can be inferred from the Hill plots in Fig. 12.
For the SynGrid model, the tail index estimates α are
within two standard deviations apart from the city sizes
index, consistently across different values of λ. The fit is
more accurate for larger values or λ, as can be observed
from the Hill plots in Fig. 13, while the outliers at the far
end of the tail could be attributed to finite size effects.
A worse fit is observed in the case of smaller networks,
as can be seen from Fig. 11. In particular, it appears
that the estimated tail index of blackout sizes decreases
monotonically to that of city sizes, and that convergence
is achieved only for n ≥ 10000. Once more, in the case of
light-tailed city sizes the heavy-tail behavior of blackout
size is not observed.
We conclude that, provided that the network is large
enough, the Pareto law of blackout sizes is inherited from
that of city sizes as predicted by our model, even in the
case where city sizes are fixed and a realistic power grid
topology is used. Moreover, when city sizes are light-
tailed, the blackout size are not heavy-tailed, providing
further support to our theory.
p niter n6=0 ntail α city sizes
0.3 10000 5066 1336 1.56± 0.04 pareto
0.5 10000 5189 366 1.31± 0.07 pareto
0.7 10000 5257 504 1.41± 0.06 pareto
0.3 10000 5225 1681 4.31± 0.11 uniform
0.5 10000 5331 1692 4.47± 0.11 uniform
0.7 10000 5332 1570 4.80± 0.12 uniform
Table III: PLFIT statistics for synthetically generated black-
out data keeping city sizes fixed, using a Watts-Strogatz
random graph model for the power grid topology with
n = 10000 nodes, m = 20000 lines, rewiring probabilities
p ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, mean degree K = 4, line limit scaling fac-
tor λ = 0.7, and different city sizes distribution. n6=0 is the
number of nonzero realizations, and ntail is the number of
realizations xi ≥ xˆmin.
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Figure 11: Visualization of PLFIT-based tail index for
synthetically generated blackout keeping city sizes fixed,
as the size n of the network increases. The power grid
topology is based on the SynGrid random graph
model [50] with m ∼ 2.5n lines, λ = 0.9, and city sizes
are sampled form a Pareto distribution. The shaded
bands correspond to 1, 2 and 3 standard deviations.
λ niter n6=0 ntail α city sizes
0.9 10000 8883 657 1.28± 0.05 pareto
0.7 10000 4308 1125 1.35± 0.04 pareto
0.5 10000 1189 435 1.23± 0.06 pareto
0.9 10000 8919 763 3.63± 0.13 uniform
0.7 10000 4764 404 4.00± 0.20 uniform
0.5 10000 1615 79 3.07± 0.35 uniform
Table IV: PLFIT statistics for synthetically generated black-
out data keeping city sizes fixed, using the SynGrid random
graph model [50] for the power grid topology with n = 10000
nodes, m ∼ 2.5n lines, for different values of λ and city sizes
distribution. n6=0 is the number of nonzero realizations, and
ntail is the number of realizations xi ≥ xˆmin.
Voltage limits and AC power flow model
In this section, we illustrate an extension of our frame-
work to the AC power flow model that takes into account
voltage limits and losses. The experiments are performed
using MATPOWER [51]. As our three stages framework
described in Section is devised with a DC power flow
model in mind, we introduce the following modifications.
First, the planning and operational OPFs, as well as the
calculation of the power flow (PF) redistribution after line
failures in the emergency phase, are performed using the
AC model [1]. The required parameters to perform these
calculations, such as voltage limits, line resistances and
reactances are pulled from the MATPOWER test cases
(as opposed to the original DC framework, which assumed
unitary reactances and zero resistances), and the OPF
and PF calculations are performed using MATPOWER’s
built-in routines.
Second, due to line losses, the active power injected
into line ` = {i, j} at its sending end, denoted by fij , will
differ from the one at the receiving end, fji. Thus, we
express the line limit constraints in terms of the maximum
of active power flows at the two ends of the line. In
particular, the line limit constraints in the operational
OPF are given by
|f`| < f¯` := λmax(|fij |, |fji|), ` = {i, j} ∈ L, (42)
for a loading factor λ ∈ (0, 1). Reactive power flow con-
straints are not considered.
Finally, the blackout size differs from the definition in
Eq. (22) to take into account losses. Specifically, in the
island with a shortage demand is shed until total demand
matches total generation minus network losses. More
precisely, after the first disconnection happens, we define
A1 be the island such that
∑
i∈A1 gi−di <
∑
i/∈A1 gi−di,
where gi is the generation at node i as given by the op-
erational OPF, and di the corresponding demand. Thus,
the blackout size is defined as
S =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈A1
(gi − di)− η
∣∣∣∣∣ , (43)
where η is a loss component defined as the sum of active
power losses on the lines belonging to A1, obtained after
solving a new OPF in the subnetwork A1.
The rest of the framework is the same as in Section .
In particular, generation limit are not considered, and all
generators are assumed to be identical with cost functions
Ci(gi) = g2i /2. We perform experiments on the IEEE
14-bus, 30-bus and 39-bus networks from [51], which are
modified accordingly to the above description. For each
simulation we run 10000 iterations using a loading factor
λ = 0.9, and we discard iterations resulting in a non-
feasible AC-OPF.
With respect to Algorithm 1, the above changes affect
steps B by using an AC model for the OPF and PF com-
putations rather than a DC model, and by adding losses
to the blackout size realizations. The rest of the frame-
work remains unchanged, i.e. city sizes are resampled at
each iteration (step A), and both a Pareto and a uniform
distribution are used for city sizes (step C).
The results are reported in Table V and Fig. 14. We
observe that, in the case of Pareto distributed city sizes,
there is indication of heavy tail for the blackout size
distribution. The tail is lighter than that of city sizes for
the 14-bus and 30-bus networks, while a much better fit
is observed for the 39-bus test case. At the same time,
there is no indication of heavy tail for the blackout size
distribution in the case of uniform city sizes, as can be
inferred from the Hill plots comparison in Fig. 14. We
conclude that, even when the DC flow model assumption is
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test case niter n6=0 ntail α city sizes
14-bus 10000 9145 2227 1.43± 0.03 pareto
30-bus 10000 7691 781 1.97± 0.07 pareto
39-bus 10000 6348 990 1.24± 0.04 pareto
14-bus 10000 9158 171 7.29± 0.56 uniform
30-bus 10000 9017 149 6.52± 0.53 uniform
39-bus 10000 8621 127 7.20± 0.64 uniform
Table V: PLFIT statistics for synthetically generated
blackout data using an AC power flow model for different
MATPOWER testcases, line limit loading factor λ = 0.9, and
different city sizes distributions. n6=0 is the number of nonzero
realizations, and ntail is the number of realizations xi ≥ xˆmin.
violated, the city size distribution still plays an important
role in affecting the distribution of blackout sizes.
We remark that these results are based on a partial
adaptation of our DC framework to the AC case. In
order to develop a more thorough mathematical theory
for the AC model, one would have to modify and extend
our framework considerably, especially the design and
operational phase. In order to do such an extension, it
would be necessary to develop a mechanism for assigning
line resistances and voltage limits in our design and oper-
ational phases, for instance, which is beyond the scope of
this study. A direction for rigorous follow-up work would
be to focus on special networks topologies (like rings), or
to use a load flow model which is intermediate between
DC and AC, such as lossless AC [52].
Convex piecewise-linear generator cost function
Our theoretical framework assumes that the cost func-
tion is a convex quadratic function (in particular, the
cost of generator i is of the form Ci(gi) = g2i /2). In this
section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results with
respect to violation of this assumption, by simulating
synthetic blackouts using a convex piecewise linear cost
function instead and comparing the results.
With respect to Algorithm 1, the change affects steps D
by modifying the objective function in the OPF. We con-
sider two MATPOWER testcases, case30 and case30pwl,
which only differs in the choice of the cost function (re-
spectively, convex quadratic and convex piecewise linear).
The testcases are modified according to our framework in
Section . In particular, the cost function of generators of
case30 is set to Ci(gi) = g2i /2, while that of the genera-
tors of case30pwl is taken from the testcase itself and set
to the convex pwl function defined by the break-points
(0, 0), (12, 144), (36, 1008), (60, 2832), expressed in (MW,
$/h). The rest of the framework remains unchanged, i.e.
city sizes are resampled at each iteration (step A), a DC
model is used (step B), and a Pareto distribution is used
for city sizes (step C).
The results, visualized in Fig. 15, show that the Pareto
fits for the quadratic and piecewise linear case are very
similar. In particular, the Hill plots show a remarkable
fit for both cases, demonstrating the robustness of our
theory to the form of the cost function.
This can be explained by observing that a key argument
in our original framework is the fact that the generation
schedule in the planning phase is as decentralized as pos-
sible, i.e. g(planning) = 1n
∑n
i=1Xie (Section ), due the
strict convexity of the quadratic objective function. This
property is partially retained with a convex piecewise lin-
ear function, since generation will be optimally allocated
to the break-points of the function, thus preserving the
decentralization feature. The main difference is when an
amount of generation greater than the largest break-point
must be produced at a certain location, in which case it
becomes optimal to produce as much as needed at that
location. This, in turn, results in more local generation
at the largest city, and thus smaller blackouts. As a re-
sults, a piecewise linear cost function results in blackouts
with smaller magnitudes than in the case of a quadratic
function, while preserving the Pareto shape, as it can be
appreciated in Fig. 15 (a), (b).
22
(a) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, p = 0.3
(b) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.3
(c) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, p = 0.3.
(d) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.3.
(e) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, p = 0.5.
(f) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.5.
(g) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, p = 0.5.
(h) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.5.
(i) PLFIT, Pareto city sizes,
p = 0.7.
(j) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.7.
(k) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, p = 0.7.
(l) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, p = 0.3.
Figure 12: Results for synthetically generated blackout data,
using a Watts-Strogatz model for the power grid topology and
keeping city sizes fixed, for different rewiring probabilities p
and different city sizes distributions. a,b,e,f,i,j): PLFIT
results and log-log plot of CCDF; c,d,g,h,k,l) Hill plot: red
line corresponds to the city sizes tail index α(city) = 1.37.
(a) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, λ = 0.5.
(b) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.5.
(c) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, λ = 0.5.
(d) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.5.
(e) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, λ = 0.7.
(f) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.7.
(g) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, λ = 0.7.
(h) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.7.
(i) PLFIT, Pareto city sizes,
λ = 0.9.
(j) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.9.
(k) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, λ = 0.9.
(l) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, λ = 0.9.
Figure 13: Results for synthetically generated blackout data,
using the SynGrid model in [50] for the power grid topology
and keeping city sizes fixed, for line limit loading factors
λ = 0.9, and different city sizes distributions. a,b,e,f,i,j):
PLFIT results and log-log plot of CCDF; c,d,g,h,k,l) Hill plot:
red line corresponds to the city sizes tail index α(city) = 1.37.
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(a) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, 14-bus network.
(b) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, 14-bus network.
(c) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, 14-bus network.
(d) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, 14-bus network.
(e) PLFIT, Pareto city
sizes, 30-bus network.
(f) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, 30-bus network.
(g) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, 30-bus network.
(h) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, 30-bus network.
(i) PLFIT, Pareto city sizes,
39-bus network.
(j) PLFIT, uniform city
sizes, 39-bus network.
(k) Hill plot, Pareto city
sizes, 39-bus network.
(l) Hill plot, uniform city
sizes, 39-bus network.
Figure 14: Results for synthetically generated blackout data
using the AC power flow model for different MATPOWER
testcases, line limit loading factor λ = 0.9, and different city
sizes distributions. a,b,e,f,i,j): PLFIT results and log-log plot
of CCDF; c,d,g,h,k,l) Hill plot: red line corresponds to the
city sizes tail index α(city) = 1.37.
(a) PLFIT, quadratic cost
function, 30-bus network.
(b) PLFIT, pwl cost
function, 30-bus network.
(c) Hill plot, quadratic cost
function, 30-bus network.
(d) Hill plot, pwl cost
function, 30-bus network.
Figure 15: Results for synthetically generated blackout data
with quadratic and pwl generation cost function, for the
IEEE 30-bus network, loading factor λ = 0.9, Pareto city size
distribution. a,b,): PLFIT results and log-log plot of CCDF;
c,d) Hill plot: red line corresponds to the city sizes tail index
α(city) = 1.37.
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SCIGRID CASE STUDY
Algorithm 2 Monte Carlo simulation - SciGRID German
Network
1: Inputs:
T = {hourly snapshots for the year 2011}
λ = line limits scaling factor
2: Initialize:
Solve OPF ∀t ∈ T with scaling factor λ ∈ (0, 1).
Set T (λ) = {feasible OPF snapshots}
For all t ∈ T (λ), let G(t) be the corresponding
network
3: procedure
4: for t ∈ T (λ) do
5: Remove 1 line uniformly at random from G(t).
6: Set G(t).changed =True
7: while G(t).changed =True do
8: Shed load/generation within each component of
G in order to achieve power balance (load shedding event)
9: Recompute normalized power flows f`
10: Remove from G all lines exceeding the original
line limit.
11: If at least one line was removed, let
G(t).changed =True; otherwise, set G(t).changed =False.
12: end while
13: Store blackout realization
14: end for
15: end procedure
We perform our experiments using PyPSA, a free soft-
ware toolbox for power system analysis [41]. We use the
dataset described in [53], which provides a model of the
German electricity system based on SciGRID [40]. The
SciGRID model represents the actual German transmis-
sion network with n = 585 nodes, 489 of which carry
loads, and m = 852 lines. Data for German city sizes are
pulled from [54], while the population of German districts,
together with the corresponding administrative borders,
are taken from [55] and [56, 57].
Since the aforementioned datasets do not include nodal
demand data, we generate relative nodal demands by
using population sizes and administrative borders of Ger-
man NUTS3 districts, which are then rescaled with hourly
nation-wide demand statistics. The procedure, based
on [58], is explained in detail below.
Nodal demand
The SciGRID model of the German power grid con-
tains 1423 generators, 585 nodes, 489 demand nodes, and
m = 852 transmission lines. Geographical coordinates
of the demand nodes are denoted by P1, . . . , P489 ∈ R2.
Moreover, Germany is partitioned into 402 NUTS3 ad-
ministrative districts: we denote by popdistr(j) ∈ R and
Pj ⊆ R2, respectively, the population and the polygon
describing the administrative borders of district j.
In order to attach the loads to the 489 demand nodes,
we proceed as follows. First, we partition Germany using
the Voronoi tessellation associated with the demand nodes.
Since some of the nodes lie outside the border of Germany,
we consider a bounding square X that contains Germany
and all the Pi-s, and we define the Voronoi cells:
V (Pi) = {x ∈ X : ||x− Pi|| ≤ ||x− Pj || ∀j 6= i}.
Then, the population of a node Pi, denoted by
popnode(i), is taken to be proportional to the overlap-
ping area between V (Pi) and all the NUTS3 districts
that intersect V (Pi). Rigorously, if we define the transfer
matrix T ∈ R489×402 as
Ti,j =
402∑
j=1
Area (V (Pi) ∩ Pj)
Area(Pj) , (44)
the nodal population can be calculated as the matrix-
vector product popnode = T popdistr.
Table VI and Fig. 18 summarizes the key statistics for
the power law fits of city, district and nodal population.
Fig. 16 shows the different partitions of Germany in
NUTS3 districts and Voronoi cells associated with Sci-
GRID demand nodes. Finally, the demand at node i at
time t, denoted by di(t), is calculated by rescaling the
country-wide demand dgermany(t) by a factor proportional
to the nodal population, as shown in Eq. 45.
di(t) = dgermany(t) · pop
node
i∑
i popnodei
(45)
Quantity N ntail α xmin · 104 KS p-value
Cities pop. 400 271 1.29± 0.08 4.4± 1 0.35
Districts pop. 402 107 2.35± 0.34 22.9± 3.8 0.65
Nodal pop. 498 51 3.77± 1.07 35.7± 7.8 0.76
Table VI: PLFIT statistics for German cities, district
and nodal population.
Simulation setup
The dataset described in [53] includes hourly nodal gen-
eration time series for the entire year 2011, together with
data for power grid topology, transmission lines limits,
generation capacities and marginal costs. After augment-
ing it with the nodal demands generated as described in
Subsection , we are able to run realistic Optimal Power
Flow (OPF) instances. We generate blackout data via
Monte Carlo simulation, as described in Algorithm 2.
First, for each of the 24 · 365 = 8760 hourly snapshots
in the year 2011, we solve the corresponding OPF using
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Figure 16: Subdivision of Germany according to NUTS3
districts and to Voronoi tessellation corresponding to
demand SciGRID nodes.
a safety factor λ ∈ (0, 1) (line 2 in Algorithm 2). This
corresponds to the operational phase in our mathemati-
cal model. Note that there is no planning phase in this
simulation since we are using a model of a real-world grid.
Among the 8760 hourly snapshots available, only a
subset results in a feasible OPF, due to the introduction
on the conservative parameter λ. Such snapshots are
called feasible OPF snapshots. Then, for each feasible
snapshot, we remove one line uniformly at random (line 5),
and let the cascade evolve as explained in Section (lines
6-12). One stage of the cascade is comprised of lines 8-11.
Note that a load shedding event (line 8) may or may
not happen during a given cascade stage, according to
whether the previous stage line failures caused a network
disconnection or not. Finally, we store the resulting
blackout realization (line 13) expressed in terms of the
total number of customers affected, obtained from the
total amount of load shed via the relationship (45). In
general, only a subset of the feasible snapshots resulted
in non-zero blackout realization, i.e. a realization with a
strictly positive blackout size, the others stopping without
disconnecting the network, and thus without any load
shedding. Table VII reports statistics on the number of
feasible OPF snapshots and non-zero blackout realizations
based on Algorithm 2.
Results and analysis
Given a cascade realization with k stages, let Li be the
cumulative load shed up to stage i, for i = 0, . . ., with the
convention L0 = 0, and let Li − Li−1 denote the amount
of load shed at stage i. The number of load shedding
events, in a blackout realization with n stages is
J = |{i = 1, . . . , k : Li − Li−1 > 0}|
Fig. 17 (corresponding to Figure 3 in the main paper)
reports the histogram and the CCDF of the total number
of load shedding events in the SciGRID network, for dif-
ferent values of λ. For a moderate loading factor λ = 0.7,
nearly 98% of the blackouts involve just a single load
shedding event, corresponding to a network disconnection.
Even for a high loading factor λ = 0.9, 90% of the black-
outs involve just a single disconnection, and the fraction
of blackouts with four or more disconnections remains
below 4% in all cases, as can be seen from Fig. 17b These
observations are typical properties that follow from our
framework, and sharply contrast the branching process
approximations where many small jumps take place.
We note that, due to the small dimension of the network
and the fact that German city sizes are kept frozen (as
opposed to our mathematical model where X1, . . . , Xn
are random variables). For a sufficiently large network,
a frozen version of our model still leads to the correct
power law behavior, as we show in Section .
(a) Histogram of J .
(b) CCDF of J .
Figure 17: Statistics for the total number of shedding
events J in the SciGRID simulation.
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loading factor λ nfeasible n6=0
0.7 3718 614
0.8 4988 858
0.9 6127 1220
Table VII: Key statistics for the SciGRID case study.
nfeasible is the number of feasible OPF snapshots, and
n 6=0 is the number of nonzero blackout realizations.
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(a) PLFIT, German cities. (b) PLFIT, German districts. (c) PLFIT, SciGRID nodes.
(d) Hill plot, German cities. (e) Hill plot, German districts. (f) Hill plot, SciGRID nodes.
Figure 18: PLFIT results for German cities, districts and nodes population.
(a) PLFIT, λ = 0.7. (b) PLFIT, λ = 0.8 (c) PLFIT, λ = 0.9.
(d) Hill plot, λ = 0.7. (e) Hill plot, λ = 0.8. (f) Hill plot, λ = 0.9.
Figure 19: Results for SciGRID blackout simulation for different values of λ. a,b,c): PLFIT results and log-log plot of
the ccdf of the number of customers affected; d,e,f) Hill plots.
